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INDUSTRY: A POSSIBLE SUBSIDY CLAIM
UNDER THE W.T.O. AGREEMENT ON
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MEASURES
VIDHI R. SHAH*
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (“E.U. Scheme”)
is the largest and most ambitious carbon dioxide emissions trading
system in the world. However, Directive 2003/87/EC, which
establishes the E.U. Scheme, gives the Member States of the
European Union too much discretion to devise individual National
Allocation Plans (“NAPs”). Germany’s NAP allows for the
allocation of free emissions allowances. This methodology is
inconsistent with the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. This comment proposes two
amendments to the Directive, namely the requirement of a minimum
level of scarcity on the amount of emissions allowances in NAPs and
the development of strict guidelines on the methods of distributions
employed in those NAPs. These amendments would have key effects
on subsequent phases of the E.U. Scheme. Specifically, they would
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prevent Member States from bringing subsidy claims in the future
and would ensure that the scheme operates at the most efficient and
cost-effective level.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“Climate change is the greatest environmental risk facing the
world today.”1 The warmest year on record was 2005,2 and the top
ten warmest years on record occurred in the past eleven years.3 The
most active Atlantic hurricane season on record was in 2005,
containing the most powerful hurricane ever recorded.4 Climate
change, which occurs largely because of harmful greenhouse gas
emissions,5 is causing these events and is not only dangerous, but is
also extremely costly.6 Because climate change is such an immense
threat, countries should control their emissions of carbon dioxide, the
main greenhouse gas, otherwise, combating global warming will
become even “more difficult and expensive.”7
To combat climate change, many countries joined the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) in
1992.8 The UNFCC Parties then adopted the Kyoto Protocol in
1. DEPARTMENT FOR ENVIRONMENT, FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS, AN
OPERATOR’S GUIDE TO THE E.U. EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME: THE STEPS TO
COMPLIANCE
2
(2006),
available
at
http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/trading/eu/intro/euetsguide.pdf [hereinafter OPERATOR’S GUIDE].
2. See
The
Climate
Group,
Climate
Change
Facts,
http://www.theclimategroup.org/index.php?pid=356 (last visited Feb. 1, 2007)
(displaying statistics collected over recent years that show the effects of the climate
change and some of its disastrous consequences).
3. See id. (reporting that 1996 was the only year of the past eleven that was
not one of the top ten warmest years on record).
4. See id. (showing that in addition to the deadly European heat wave of 2003
and the disappearance of glaciers, climate change can cause other catastrophic
effects such as hurricanes).
5. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May
9, 1992, S. Treaty Doc. No. 102–38 (1992), 1771 U.N.T.S. 165, 168 [hereinafter
UNFCCC] (defining greenhouse gases as “natural and anthropogenic” gases in the
atmosphere that “absorb and re-emit infrared radiation”).
6. See id.; Steve Lohr, The Cost of an Overheated Planet, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
12, 2006, at C1 (predicting the high costs of carbon dioxide emissions on future
generations in the form of low farm output in poor countries, and an increased
number of refugees fleeing stronger hurricanes and coastal floods).
7. See id. (revealing that even the chief executive of a coal-burning utility
advocates federally regulating carbon dioxide emissions by imposing costs on its
emission).
8. See UNFCCC, supra note 5, 1771 U.N.T.S. at 165 (recognizing the threat
of global climate change and setting general goals to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions in order to stabilize the concentration of such gases in the earth’s
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1997.9 The Kyoto Protocol shares the UNFCCC’s objectives, but
strengthens them by adding legally binding targets of greenhouse gas
emissions reductions.10 For example, the European Union must
reduce emissions by eight percent.11 To meet this target, the
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union
(“Council”) established the European Union Emissions Trading
Scheme (“E.U. Scheme”) pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC
(“Directive”).12
The purpose of emissions trading is to combat climate change by
creating a market to provide efficient and practical solutions for
reducing greenhouse gas emissions.13 Subsidies, however, defeat the
objective of emissions trading by causing distortions in the market
process.14 Subsidies decrease the efficiency with which an industry,

atmosphere at a “level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference
with the climate system”).
9. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
10. See id. art. 2–3, Annex B, 37 I.L.M. at 32–34, 43 (stressing that the
ultimate objective of the Kyoto Protocol is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in
pursuit of the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC, and listing the emissions
standards for each country along with the rules for implementing those standards).
11. See id. Annex B, 37 I.L.M. at 43 (listing the specific emissions reduction
targets for each Annex I country).
12. See Council Directive 2003/87, ¶ 5, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32 (EC) (announcing
that the objective of the E.U. Scheme is to help the European Union fulfill its
reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol).
13. See GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, STATEMENT,
NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE E.U. EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME, 1, 3–4
(Apr. 2006), available at http://www.umweltrat.de/english/eframe01.htm
(explaining that the original purpose of emissions trading was to provide an
economic incentive for countries and industries to operate in a more environmentfriendly way by making carbon dioxide pollution a “production factor” whose
costs must be accounted for when forecasting production amounts); see also Susan
J. Kurkowski, Distributing the Right to Pollute in the European Union: Efficiency,
Equity, and the Environment, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 698, 704–05 (2006) (listing
the five benefits that should result from emissions trading: (1) emissions reductions
in a cost-effective manner; (2) higher compliance levels; (3) incentives for
technological innovation; (4) reduced regulatory burdens; and (5) easier
monitoring and enforcement); Lohr, supra note 6 (insisting that economic
incentives are necessary for investment in cleanup and more fuel-efficient
technological innovation).
14. See infra Part III.A.2 (concluding that, due to the E.U. Scheme granting its
Member States discretion over their allocation of emissions allowances within their
borders, Germany’s current system of allocation is a potential subsidy and serves
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or an installation,15 allocates its resources, thereby violating the spirit
of the Kyoto Protocol.16
This comment acknowledges the potential benefits of the E.U.
Scheme, but proposes an amendment to the Directive to prevent
future subsidy claims the current setup could trigger. Part II briefly
discusses the E.U. Scheme, National Allocation Plans (“NAPs”), and
different methods of allocating emissions allowances. In addition, it
discusses Germany’s NAP and the World Trade Organization’s
(“WTO”) Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(“SCM Agreement”).17 Part III analyzes the NAP of Germany and
possible subsidy claims that could arise under the SCM Agreement.
Part IV recommends that the Council modify the E.U. Scheme by
imposing a uniform minimum level of scarcity and ensuring that the
E.U. Member States18 use consistent methods of allocation. Part V
concludes that although the E.U. Scheme is a good model for
emissions trading in the international arena, it is imperfect, and thus
the Council should amend it to avoid potential subsidy claims.

to distort the emissions market); see also Kurkowski, supra note 13, at 704–05
(listing one of the benefits of emissions trading as reducing greenhouse gas
emissions in a cost-effective manner).
15. For purposes of this comment “installation” is defined as under Council
Directive 2003/87. See Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 12, art. 3(e) (“[A]
stationary technical unit where one or more activities listed in Annex I are carried
out and any other directly associated activities which have a technical connection
with the activities carried out on that site and which could have an effect on
emissions and pollution.”).
16. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ALAN O. SYKES, LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, 770 (4th ed. 2002)
(explaining that the key issue in identifying subsidies, or any government measure,
is determining whether those measures are distorting or correcting the market
process).
17. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex IA. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
1869 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM Agreement] (defining “subsidy” for the
purposes of the World Trade Organization); infra Part II B–C.
18. Throughout this comment, a “Member State” refers to a country that is a
part of the European Union, while a “Member Country” refers to a country that is a
part of the WTO. As it turns out, all Member States of the European Union are
Member Countries of the WTO.
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II. BACKGROUND
On February 16, 2005, the Kyoto Protocol entered into force.19 It
became legally binding when at least “55 Parties to the Convention
[the UNFCCC], incorporating Parties included in Annex I which
accounted in total for at least 55 per cent of the total carbon dioxide
emissions for 1990 of the Parties included in Annex I20 ratified the
Kyoto Protocol.21 The Kyoto Protocol made the emissions reductions
goals listed in Annex B22 binding on the countries that ratified it.
Annex B assigns emissions allowances, or rights to emit gases,23 to
the countries in order to promote the UNFCCC’s mission of

19. See Press Release, United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP],
Kyoto Protocol to Enter into Force 16 February 2005 (Nov. 18, 2004), available at
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=412&Arti
cleID=4669&l=en (announcing that the Kyoto Protocol was entering into force and
would become legally binding on its 128 Parties ninety days after the Russian
Federation ratified it on November 18, 2004).
20. See UNFCCC, supra note 5, Annex I, 1771 U.N.T.S. at 189 (listing the
developed or industrialized countries, such as Austria, Canada, Denmark, New
Zealand, Turkey, and the United States, in Annex I of the UNFCCC).
21. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, art. 24, 37 I.L.M. at 41 (explaining that
the Kyoto Protocol was only to become binding on the ninetieth day after the two
conditions were met and each party had deposited its instruments of ratification,
acceptance, approval, or accession).
22. See id. Annex B, 37 I.L.M. at 43 (enumerating all of the developed
countries listed in Annex I of the UNFCCC except for two, Belarus and Turkey,
along with each country’s “quantified emission limitation or reduction
commitment”); id. art. 3(1), 37 I.L.M at 33 (mandating that all Annex I countries
not exceed their allowed amounts of greenhouse gas emissions, which are
calculated according to their limitation and reduction commitments listed in Annex
B).
23. See Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 12, art. 3(a) (defining an
allowance as “an allowance to emit one tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent during
a specified period”). But see Kirk W. Junker, Ethical Emissions Trading and the
Law, 13 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 149, 150, 152–53 (2006) (pointing out that the
definition of allowances in the United States Clean Air Act does not define
emissions allowances as property rights, but instead characterizes them as
transferable authorizations to emit gases. See generally Daveed Garenstein-Ross,
An Analysis of the Rights-Based Justification for Federal Intervention in
Environmental Regulation, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 185, 187 (2003);
Gerald Torres, Who Owns the Sky?, 19 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 515, 517 (2002);
Daniel H. Cole, Clearing the Air: Four Propositions about Property Rights and
Environmental Protection, 10 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 103, 105 (1999)
(discussing the general concept of property rights relating to environmental
regulation).
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stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations24 in the atmosphere at a
level that will prevent harmful interference with the climate system.25
The Kyoto Protocol contains three mechanisms26 that Annex I
countries can use to comply with the reduction requirements of
Annex B.27 The first two mechanisms, the “joint implementation
mechanism”28 and the “clean development mechanism,”29 involve

24. See UNFCCC, supra note 5, art. 1(5), 1771 U.N.T.S. at 168 (defining
greenhouse gases); see also Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, Annex A, 37 I.L.M. at
42 (listing the greenhouse gases included for emissions reductions purposes:
carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and
sulphur hexafluoride).
25. See UNFCCC, supra note 5, art. 2, 1771 U.N.T.S. at 169 (elaborating that
countries can achieve the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC by stabilizing the
level of greenhouse gas emissions within a period of time that is sufficient to
“allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change,” and to guarantee that
resources for food production and economic development continue to thrive in a
sustainable manner).
26. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, arts. 6, 12, 16 bis, 37 I.L.M. at 35, 38, 40
(setting out the three different mechanisms: the joint implementation mechanism,
clean development mechanism, and emissions trading).
27. See id. Annex A, B, 37 I.L.M. at 42, 43 (listing the numerical reduction
requirements to which all Annex B countries must adhere and the sectors or source
categories that are subject to emissions reductions: energy; industrial processes;
solvent and other product use; agriculture; and waste).
28. See id. art. 6, 37 I.L.M. at 35 (discussing the joint implementation
mechanism, which allows Annex I countries to transfer and acquire emissions
reductions units, as long as they are the products of certain projects that aim
specifically at reducing emissions, from other Annex I countries to meet their
Annex B and Article 3 obligations under the Kyoto Protocol). The joint
implementation mechanism projects are subject to certain conditions: (1) the
countries involved must approve them; (2) the countries must ensure that the
reduction of emissions are additional to any reduction that would otherwise occur;
(3) the acquiring country must be in compliance with its obligations under Articles
5 and 7 of the Kyoto Protocol; and (4) the countries must ensure that the
“acquisition of emission reduction units” are in addition to domestic actions that
they undertake to meet the commitments set forth in Article 3. Id.
29. See id. art. 12, 37 I.L.M. at 38 (noting that the second mechanism, the clean
development mechanism, encourages Annex I countries to assist countries not
listed in Annex I—the developing countries—in achieving and contributing to
sustainable development by funding projects in these countries). Participating
Annex I countries can use the certified emissions reductions resulting from the
projects to meet their own emissions reductions commitments. Clean development
mechanism projects are subject to certain conditions: (1) the voluntary
participation of the countries involved; (2) a showing of “real, measurable longterm benefits” for the climate; and (3) the reductions must be additional to any
reductions that would otherwise occur in the absence of a funded project. Id.
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special projects that facilitate emissions reductions. The third
mechanism permits Annex B countries to trade emissions allowances
to fulfill their commitments under Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol.30
The Council established the Directive in order to create a system that
would help Member States achieve their Annex B commitments31
using the third mechanism—”emissions trading.”32

A. THE EUROPEAN UNION EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME AND
NATIONAL ALLOCATION PLANS
Under the Kyoto Protocol, the European Union committed to an
aggregate eight percent reduction33 of greenhouse gas emissions from
1990 levels during the first commitment period of the Kyoto
Protocol, 2008 to 2012.34 The E.U. Scheme allows for the allocation
and trade of greenhouse gas emissions allowances.35 It provides for
30. See id. art. 16 bis, 37 I.L.M. at 40 (mandating that, as with joint
implementation and clean development mechanisms, countries make emissions
trading supplemental to domestic actions that they undertake to meet their
reductions commitments specified in Article 3). Countries may add emissions
reduction units, or any part of an assigned amount of emissions allowances, which
they acquire from another country using the clean development mechanism, to
their assigned amounts. Alternatively, if a country transfers emissions reduction
units to another country using the joint implementation or emissions trading
mechanisms, it may subtract them from its assigned amounts. Id. art. 3(10)–(13),
37 I.L.M. at 33.
31. See Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 12, ¶¶ 3–4 (defining the
UNFCCC’s objective as the achievement of the stabilization of atmospheric
greenhouse gases at the reduced levels that Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol
assigned to the countries that ratified it).
32. See Cinnamon Carlarne, Climate Change Policies an Ocean Apart: EU and
US Climate Change Policies Compared, 14 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 435, 465
(2006) (explaining that the E.U. Scheme is supplemental to the national programs
of Member States, as well as to their participation in the first two mechanisms in
the Kyoto Protocol—the joint implementation mechanism and clean development
mechanism projects).
33. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, Annex B, 37 I.L.M. at 43 (showing that
the European Union, as a whole, committed to an aggregate eight percent
reduction, individual countries of the European Union also have individual
reduction commitments in Annex B).
34. See Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 12, ¶4.
35. See OPERATOR’S GUIDE, supra note 1, at 2–4 (highlighting how the
“market-based” approach allows installations discretion to buy and sell allowances
according to their needs but simultaneously ensures that installations do not exceed
their allocated emissions). The E.U. Scheme is implemented by requiring Member
States to make the Directive part of their national legislation. Id. at 4.
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the flexibility, which the Kyoto Protocol envisioned,36 to buy
additional allowances or sell surplus allowances.37 Pursuant to the
Directive, Member States decide on the total quantity and allocation
of allowances to each installation that the Directive covers.38
The E.U. Scheme is one of the most significant policies that the
European Union has enacted to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
The E.U. Scheme covers specified installations, mostly in the energy
production sector.39 They total to over 11,400 installations
throughout the European Union, and are responsible for about half of
all carbon dioxide emissions in the European Union.40 About 1,849
of the installations are located in Germany,41 and these installations
account for fifty-nine percent of the country’s carbon dioxide
emissions.42
Under the Directive, an allowance consists of the right to emit one
ton of carbon dioxide or its equivalent43 during a specific time
period.44 Phase I, which runs from 2005 to 2007,45 is the “learning
phase” of the E.U. Scheme,46 allowing Member States an opportunity
36. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 9, art. 16 bis, 37 I.L.M. at 40 (noting that
trading “shall be supplemental to domestic actions for the purpose of meeting
quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under that Article”).
37. OPERATOR’S GUIDE, supra note 1, at 2.
38. See Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 12, arts. 9(1), 11(1)–(2)
(referring Member States to Annex III of the Directive, which provides them with
eleven general criteria to follow when they devise their individual NAPs).
39. See GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 13, at
7 (defining the energy production sector as one that emits over twenty megawatts
of heat output).
40. See id.; Kurkowski, supra note 13, at 699–700 (elaborating on the
unprecedented scope of the E.U. Scheme, which is not only the first multinational
emissions trading scheme, but also the first large-scale carbon dioxide emissions
trading system in the world).
41. See GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 13, at
7.
42. See id. (suggesting that Germany will allocate its carbon dioxide emissions
free of charge until 2008, in line with the Directive’s mandate).
43. See Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 12, art. 3(a).
44. See id. art. 3(a) (maintaining that the allowance is valid “only for the
purposes of meeting the requirements of [the] Directive and shall be transferable in
accordance with the provisions of [the] Directive”).
45. See id. art. 10 (noting that during the initial three-year period, Member
States “shall allocate at least 95% of the allowances free of charge”).
46. See Kurkowski, supra note 13, at 706 (identifying the participating
industries in the “learning phase” as “energy and major emitting industrials”).

SHAH.DOC

454

3/31/2007 12:49:03 PM

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[22:445

to accustom themselves to trading before the first Kyoto Protocol
commitment period.47 Phase II of the E.U. Scheme runs
simultaneously with the first Kyoto Protocol commitment period,
2008 to 2012.48
The E.U. Scheme requires each Member State to develop a NAP
that contains the total amount of emissions allowances that the
Member State plans to allocate, as well as the ways in which it
wishes to allocate them.49 The Directive also mandates that the
Member States base their NAPs on “objective and transparent
criteria,” and “take due account of comments from the public.”50
Member States must then submit their NAPs to the Council for
approval.51 The Council can reject a NAP within three months of its
submission if the NAP does not conform to the specified
guidelines.52
Each NAP consists of a Macroplan and a Microplan.53 A
Macroplan defines the total emissions budget for the Member State
47. See id.; see also Inho Choi, Global Climate Change and the Use of
Economic Approaches: The Ideal Design Features of Domestic Greenhouse Gas
Emissions Trading with an Analysis of the European Union's CO2 Emissions
Trading Directive and the Climate Stewardship Act, 45 NAT. RESOURCES J. 865,
913 (2005) (explaning that the four industries participating in Phase I of the E.U.
Scheme include: iron and steel production and processing; minerals industries;
electricity and refineries; and pulp and paper).
48. See Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 12, art. 10 (noting that during
Phase II, “Member States shall allocate 90% of the allowances free of charge”);
see also Carlarne, supra note 32, at 464 (explaining that Phase I includes only
carbon dioxide emissions, but Phase II includes emissions of other greenhouse
gases)
49. See id. art. 9 (providing guidelines that Member States should follow when
they devise their NAPs for each period identified in Articles 11(1) and (2)).
50. See id. art. 9(3) (referring Member States to Annex III for further
guidelines on developing their NAPs).
51. See GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 13, at
7 (explaining that NAPs must comply with a range of requirements that the
Directive sets forth, and offering as an example the requirement that reduction
targets take into account obligations under the Kyoto Protocol).
52. See Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 12, art. 9(3) (mandating that the
Commission provide the reasons for rejection to the Member State if its NAP is
incompatible with the criteria listed under Article 10 and Annex III).
53. See, e.g., FEDERAL MINISTRY FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, NATURE
CONSERVATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY, NATIONAL ALLOCATION PLAN FOR THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 2005–2007, at 6 (2004) [hereinafter GERMAN
NAP].
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and determines the total quantity of allowances that the government
intends to distribute.54 A Microplan details how the government
plans to distribute allowances to each of the participating
installations.55

B. THE GERMAN NATIONAL ALLOCATION PLAN AND ITS STEEL
INDUSTRY
Germany based its emissions budget for its Macroplan on its target
for the first reduction commitment of the Kyoto Protocol,56 as well as
on the burden-sharing agreement within the European Union.57
During Phase I, the E.U. Scheme confines emissions trading only to
carbon dioxide.58 Germany distributed one-hundred percent of its
emissions allowances free of charge during Phase I.59 During Phase
54. See id. at 6, 12 (explaining that Germany’s Macroplan directs the
dispersion of the national emissions budget between various greenhouse gases,
emissions trading segments, and to other sources consistent with its “national
climate protection targets”).
55. See id. at 6, 7 (elaborating that the Microplan “defines the methods, rules,
and criteria” for allocation decisions, as well as the quantity of emissions
allowances that the Member State will grant to each of the individual installations).
56. See id. at 6 (stating that for the Phase II, Germany must reduce emissions
by twenty-one percent compared to 1990 levels). The Macroplan supports the
requirements of the E.U. reductions budget by breaking down the emissions
allowances by type of greenhouse gas and sector. Id.
57. See Kurkowski, supra note 13, at 705–08 (describing how the burdensharing agreement distributes among Member States the eight percent required
reduction from 1990 emissions levels in accordance with each country’s
expectation for economic growth). For example, it requires Germany, a country of
great relative wealth, to make a twenty-one percent reduction from 1990 levels,
while allowing the less well-off Greece to actually increase its emissions twentyfive percent above 1990 levels. Id. at 706. See also Paul Q. Watchman,
Background to the EU ETS, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 191, 194 (J.
William Futrelle et al. eds., 2006) (noting that all twenty-five Member States of the
European Union have reduction commitments, however only the original fifteen
have commitments under the burden-sharing agreement). All the new members
must reduce their emissions by eight percent of 1990 levels, except for Hungry and
Poland, which must reduce their emissions by six percent of 1990 levels. Id.
58. See GERMAN NAP, supra note 53, at 6, 13 (cautioning, however, that the
Macroplan must provide for compensatory measures to combat unexpected
changes in the emission of other gases that may occur in response to restrictions on
CO2 emissions).
59. See id. at 4 (explaining that Article 10 of the Directive requires Member
States to allocate at least ninety-five percent of emissions allowances free of
charge during Phase 1).
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II, Germany once again plans to distribute one-hundred percent of
the allowances free of charge.60 It will only charge for the costs of
issuing and distributing emissions certificates and for any costs that
arise in connection with the maintenance of a registry of
allowances.61
During Phase I, the German NAP includes only certain industries
and installations.62 The energy and industry sectors comprise most of
the installations participating during Phase I.63 Moreover, the E.U.
Scheme does not allow two sectors, transport and households, to
participate in emissions trading.64
The E.U. Scheme allows for many different methods of allocating
allowances.65 The “grandfathering method” allows Member States to
base allocation on historic emissions levels,66 so the amount of
60. See id. at 21.
61. See id. at 4 n.2.
62. See id. at 9, 11 (explaining that whether an installation is subject to
emissions trading will depend on whether it falls within one of the categories in
Germany’s “list of relevant installations,” including “energy generation and
conversion,” “production and processing of ferrous metals,” “mineral industry,”
and “other industrial activities”).
63. See id. at 19.
64. See id. at 20 (rationalizing that the German government has undertaken
different measures and policies to reduce the amount of harmful greenhouse gas
emissions in these sectors); see also Kurkowski, supra note 13, at 706–07
(explaining that because the E.U. Scheme includes emissions from non-trading
sectors in the aggregate reductions requirements, when devising NAPs and
allocating emissions allowances, Member States will take any potential reductions
from these non-trading sectors into account).
65. See Annie Petsonk, The Kyoto Protocol and the WTO: Integrating the
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Allowance Trading into the Global Marketplace, 10
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 185, 206–08 (2000) (contending that every country
may select the way in which it allocates the burden of emissions limits, “regardless
of the form of environmental regulation,” and despite the fact that certain methods
may “favor some groups over others”); see also European Comm’n, Working 3
Monitoring Mechanism Comm., Non-Paper, The EU Emissions Trading Scheme:
How to Develop a National Allocation Plan, 5, Apr. 1, 2003 [hereinafter How to
Develop a NAP].
66. See Petsonk, supra note 65, at 207 (explaining that under the
grandfathering approach countries may subdivide their emissions allocations into
either “upstream” or “downstream” allocations); see also How to Develop a NAP,
supra note 65, at 4 (emphasizing that under such an approach, a Member State will
distribute some or all of its emissions allowances among the participating
industries and installations according to the shares of their historic emissions levels
during a particular year, and then it will multiply that number by the total amount
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emissions that the installations emitted during a specific period
determines allocation.67 Under the “auction method” of allocation, a
Member State auctions its allowances for the commitment period to
the highest bidders.68 The “benchmarking method” allows Member
States to base individual allocations of allowances on “the average
specific emissions of a product category.”69
Different rules and procedures, such as banking,70 govern the
allocation of emissions allowances under different circumstances.71
of emissions available).
67. See CLIMATE ACTION NETWORK EUROPE, NATIONAL ALLOCATION PLANS
2005–7: DO THEY DELIVER? 24 (2006), available at www.climnet.org [hereinafter
CAN EUROPE] (pointing out that the E.U. Scheme does not define specific base
years for Member States to use for allocations). This is problematic because
Member States tend to choose a calculation of base years that ensures above
average base levels of emissions, resulting in a greater allocation of emissions
allowances and leading to “additional distortions and complaints about fairness
within countries and across borders.” Id. at 24–25.
68. See id. at 27 (recommending that Member States distribute emissions
allowances using the auction method, so the “‘polluter pays principle’ can be fully
implemented” in the E.U. Scheme). In addition, the auction method has major
advantages over the grandfathering and benchmark methods because it generates
revenue for the government and provides the biggest incentive for installations to
reduce emissions so they do not have to pay for more emissions allowances. Id.
See also Petsonk, supra note 65, at 207 (elaborating that governments can hold
auctions more than once, and even during the commitment period).
69. GERMAN NAP, supra note 53, at 7; see CAN EUROPE, supra note 67, at 25
(clarifying that the Benchmarking Method is “inherently sector or even sub-sector
specific,” and emphasizing that Member States should not make benchmarks fuelspecific, but should make them product-specific); see also GERMAN ADVISORY
COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 13, at 10 (criticizing the fuel-specific
method because when benchmarks focus on the best-available technology at a
particular installation, this results in differing allocations for fuel, such as coal and
gas). This fuel-specific method reduces the incentive for installations to switch
from coal and gas to fuels that are more efficient. Id.
70. See GERMAN NAP, supra note 53, at 43 (explaining that the Directive
permits Member States to transfer, or “bank,” unused allowances at the end of a
trading period on to the next period). The German NAP does not permit
installations to bank the unused allowances from Phase I and use them in Phase II
because the banking of allowances would increase the total allowances distributed
during the Kyoto Protocol commitment period 2008 to 2012. Id. at 43–44.
Furthermore, the lack of harmonization of banking arrangements throughout the
European Union would make it harder for a Member State to achieve its Kyoto
Protocol target. Id. at 43.
71. See id. at 21 (explaining that the transfer rule and the new entrant rule
govern the allocation of emissions allowances to certain existing and new
installations, and the closure rule allows for the modification of the allowances that
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Special rules may apply “for installations that achieved early
emissions reductions (early actions), for process-related emissions,
for installations using combined heat and power, and for closure of
nuclear power plants.”72 These special rules cause regulatory
uncertainty because they result in allocations that exceed the
forecasted budget.73
Germany allocated allowances using the grandfathering method
and the benchmarking method.74 In addition, it applied special rules
to its steel industry, regulating it under “process-related emissions”
because the release of carbon dioxide results from “a chemical
reaction other than combustion.”75 Therefore, Germany granted these
types of processes special treatment76 when it assigned and allocated
emissions allowances.77

Member States issued to decommissioned installations, whose allowances are not
transferable to new installations). The transfer rule allows for the transfer of
emissions from installations that Member States decommissioned to installations
commissioned starting January 1, 2005, and the new entrant rule allows for the
allocation of free allowances to installations that are not eligible to receive
allowances through the transfer rule. Id. In addition, Member States modify the
issuance of allowances in conjunction with certain “capacity utilisation adjustment
rules.” Id.
72. GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 13, at 11
(internal cross-references omitted).
73. See id. at 11–12 (suggesting that the special allocation rules also result in
installations postponing investment into more energy-efficient equipment and
activities). This results in higher future allocations of emissions allowances and
lower liquidity in current emissions trading. Id.
74. See id. (explaining that the German government will use emissions data
from the 2000 to 2002 reference period when it calculates the allocation of
allowances under the grandfathering and the benchmarking methods).
75. Id. at 39 (manufacture of oxygen steel and pig iron production).
76. See id. (distinguishing process-related emissions from energy-related
emissions, which the government calculates on the basis of the rules in Section C.6
of the German NAP and which uses the generally applicable compliance factor).
77. See id. at 39–40 (elaborating that Annex III of the Directive gives Member
States the basis on which to grant special treatment, and it instructs that
governments take into account the “technological potential for reductions”).
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C. SUBSIDY CLAIMS ARISING UNDER THE AGREEMENT ON
SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES
In international trade, two categories of subsidies exist: domestic
and export.78 A domestic subsidy arises when the government grants
a financial contribution to an industry, regardless of whether the
industry exports its products.79 An export subsidy occurs when the
government pays an industry only for the products it actually
exports.80 The main issue regarding subsidies is not whether the
governmental measures cause distortions, but whether the measures
positively or negatively effect the efficiency with which an industry
allocates resources.81
Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement, which is a WTO82 trade
agreement, details that a subsidy exists when a government makes a
“financial contribution” to an industry within its territory.83 A
subsidy can occur if the practice in question involves a “direct
transfer of funds,” such as “grants, loans, and equity infusion,” or a
“potential direct transfer of funds or liabilities.”84 It can also occur if
the government provides “any form of income or price support.”85
But, most importantly, the financial contribution must result in a
“benefit... conferred” to the subsidizing Member Country’s

78. JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 16, at 767.
79. See id. at 767–68 (defining a domestic subsidy and explaining that a
subsidy is a protectionist measure because it lowers prices on domestic products
below prices of competing foreign products).
80. See id. at 768 (asserting that in the case of export subsidies, exporters can
sell goods in other countries at a price below the domestic price for the same
goods, resulting in an uneconomic allocation of resources).
81. Id. at 770.
82. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
Pmbl., Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 3 (reaffirming the WTO’s commitments to
“develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral trading system,” while
“allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with the
objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the
environment”). See generally JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 16, at 208–09
(discussing the evolution of the WTO from the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade of 1947 (“GATT”), a provisional international trade treaty).
83. See SCM Agreement, supra note 17, art. 1.1, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 14 (defining
“subsidy” for the purposes of the World Trade Organization).
84. Id. art. 1.1(a)(1)(i), 1869 U.N.T.S. at 14.
85. Id. art. 1.1(a)(2), 1869 U.N.T.S. at 14 (referring to the definition of income
or price support in Article XVI of GATT 1994).
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industry.86 The WTO Appellate Body analyzed this provision in
Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, and
interpreted “benefit” as an advantage to the recipient in the market.87
The SCM Agreement defines three categories of subsidies in
Articles 3, 5, and 8.88 The first category consists of prohibited
subsidies, which are export subsidies.89 The second consists of
actionable subsidies, which cause “adverse effects” to the interests of
another Member Country.90 Finally, the third category consists of
non-actionable subsidies,91 which are a limited category of subsidies

86. Id. art. 1.1(b), 1869 U.N.T.S. at 14.
87. See Appellate Body Report, Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of
Civilian Aircraft, ¶¶ 149–61, WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999) [hereinafter
Canada—Civilian Aircraft] (upholding the Panel’s interpretation of a benefit, and
stressing that the benefit does not have to be conferred to the granting authority or
government).
88. SCM Agreement, supra note 17, arts. 3, 5, 8, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 16, 18, 22–
24; see also id. arts. 4, 7, 9, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 16–17, 20–22, 25 (assigning differing
remedies to violations of each of the specific types of subsidies because of
differing degrees of harm to the complaining Member Country, or degrees of
benefits conferred to the subsidizing Member Country).
89. See id. art. 3, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 16 (providing that this type of subsidy must
be contingent on export performance, or on the use of domestic over imported
products); see also OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, EXECUTIVE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, THE
URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENTS ACT: AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND
COUNTERVAILING MEASURES (1994) [hereinafter USTR STATEMENT] (pointing out
that to challenge this type of subsidy, a Member Country must only prove the
existence of the subsidy, but does not have to demonstrate that the subsidy has any
adverse trade effects); Petsonk, supra note 65, at 205 (explaining that the WTO
subjects prohibited subsidies to an “expedited timetable for action by the Dispute
Settlement body,” so if it finds a prohibited subsidy, the subsidizing Member
Country must immediately withdraw it or the complaining Member Country can
take appropriate countermeasures).
90. See SCM Agreement, supra note 17, art. 5, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 18 (stressing
that no Member Country can act in a way that will cause adverse effects to the
interests of others by: injuring the domestic industry of another Member Country;
“nullifying or impairing” the benefits accruing, either directly or indirectly, to
another Member Country; or by seriously prejudicing the interests of another
Member Country).
91. See id. art. 8, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 23–24 (describing in detail the different
situations under which a panel may characterize subsidies as non-actionable
subsidies); see also Petsonk, supra note 65, at 205–06 (elaborating on the types of
possible specific subsidies that involve assistance, such as: support for industrial
research; development activities in disadvantaged regions; or assistance for
adapting existing facilities to meet environmental requirements that new
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that are not actionable if they meet the strict criteria enumerated in
the SCM Agreement,92 particularly in Article 8.2(c).93
If a Member Country believes that another Member Country’s
measure is a subsidy, it must first conduct consultations with the
suspected Member Country.94 If consultations are not successful, the
complaining Member Country can request that a panel hear its
claim.95 The panel will make a decision and order a remedy if
appropriate.96 Both Member Countries will have the opportunity to
appeal the panel decision to the Appellate Body.97

III. ANALYSIS
Germany’s allocation of free emissions allowances is a subsidy
because it constitutes a financial contribution by the government and
a benefit is conferred to the installations that receive the financial
contribution, which is the allocation of free emissions allowances.98
Once a panel concludes that a particular measure is a subsidy, it must
determine what type of subsidy the measure constitutes.99 In this

regulations impose).
92. See USTR STATEMENT, supra note 89 (listing and analyzing the criteria for
the three types of non-actionable subsidies: research subsidies; subsidies to
disadvantaged regions; and subsidies for environmental adaptation).
93. SCM Agreement, supra note 17, art. 8.2(c), 1869 U.N.T.S. at 24.
94. See JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 16, at 259 (hypothesizing that
the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding requires consultations to allow
Member Countries to resolve disputes without resorting to formal dispute
settlement procedures).
95. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade
Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade
Negotiations, Annex 2, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, art. 4.7, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1229 (1994)
[hereinafter Understanding on Rules and Procedures] (providing a sixty day
timeframe for countries to settle a dispute with consultations).
96. See id. art. 11, 33 I.L.M. at 1233 (requiring panels to make an “objective
assessment” of the issues in regard to the facts of the particular cases and relevant
provisions in dispute). In addition, panels should submit final reports within six
months, or in emergencies, within three months. Id. art. 12.8., 33 I.L.M. at 1234.
97. See id. art. 17.1, 33 I.L.M. at 1236
98. See SCM Agreement, supra note 17, art. 1.1, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 14
(providing that a subsidy could exist if not just the government, but “any public
body within the territory of a Member,” makes a financial contribution and a
benefit is conferred).
99. See id. arts. 4, 7, 9, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 16–17, 20–22, 25 (providing a
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case, a panel could find that the allocation of free emissions
allowances is either an actionable subsidy100 or a non-actionable
subsidy. 101

A. GERMANY’S ALLOCATION OF FREE EMISSIONS ALLOWANCES
COULD CONSTITUTE A SUBSIDY AS DEFINED BY ARTICLE 1.1 OF
THE SCM AGREEMENT
Germany’s allocation of free emissions allowances pursuant to its
NAP could constitute a subsidy. Under the SCM Agreement, a
subsidy results when a government makes a “financial contribution”
to an industry within its territory and a “benefit is... conferred” to the
subsidized industry.102 A WTO panel must ultimately assess whether
a governmental measure meets these two conditions.103
1. The Allocation of Free Allowances Constitutes a Distribution of a
“Financial Contribution”
The first and most important question regarding the allocations of
free allowances is whether a WTO panel would hold that these
allowances are financial contributions.104 When Germany allocates
consultation process for dispute resolution and remedies due once the Members
determine the type of subsidy that a measure constitutes).
100. See id. art. 5, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 18 (defining an actionable subsidy as one
that is “specific” and causes “adverse effects to the interests” of other Member
Countries).
101. See id. art. 8.1, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 22 (identifying non-actionable subsidies
as those that are not “specific,” according to Article 2, or those that are “specific”
but fall within one of the three categories and meet the conditions that Article 8.2
outlines).
102. Id. art. 1, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 14; see JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note
16, at 780 (clarifying that WTO law generally characterizes subsidies as the benefit
to the recipient, rather than the cost to the subsidizing government, because a “cost
to the government” interpretation would exclude situations where a private body
under the government’s direction confers a “benefit”).
103. See JACKSON DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 16, at 260 (discussing the WTO
Dispute Settlement Understanding, and indicating that a panel is composed of three
individuals who serve not as representatives of their countries, but in their
individual capacities, and many of whom are government officials, former
Secretariat officials, trade academics, or trade lawyers). The WTO Dispute
Settlement Understanding dictates that the panel examines the matter at issue “in
light of the relevant provisions” at dispute, makes appropriate findings and
recommendations, or gives rulings. Id. at 261.
104. See SCM Agreement, supra note 17, art. 1.1, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 14
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free emissions allowances to industries, specifically the steel industry
and its participating installations, the installations receive windfall
benefits.105 Essentially, Germany is allocating significant assets to the
installations.106 As a result, Germany is granting financial
contributions to the steel industry.107
When a country allocates emissions allowances, it alters the asset
base of an installation.108 In an efficient emissions trading system,
installations have incentives to take measures to reduce emissions,
such as investing in more efficient and less carbon intensive
technology to become more competitive.109 However, when Germany
grants free emissions allowances, installations receive windfall
profits, regardless of any improved competitive position or
profitability.110
The German steel installations will automatically have an
advantage over steel installations in other Member States, whose

(elaborating on various circumstances under which a government can make a
financial contribution). But see Petsonk, supra note 65, at 208 (theorizing that a
WTO panel would probably answer this initial question in the negative).
105. See GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 13, at
2.
106. See id. (analogizing the allocation of free emissions allowances with the
allocation of assets to the businesses and installations that receive them).
107. See id. at 16 (characterizing the allocation of free allowances as an “acrossthe-board subsidy” because the emissions allowances are not linked to the
business’s output and so changes its asset values). But see Petsonk, supra note 65,
at 208–09 (arguing that characterizing allocations as subsidies would be the same
as saying that “any allocation of any type of responsibility for regulation,” either
domestic or international, would also constitute a subsidy).
108. See GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 13, at
2 (arguing that a government will alter the asset base of an installation if it
distributes emissions allowances free of charge, and this alteration will be
independent of the installation’s new level of profitability, therefore, having
nothing to do with an increased ability to make profits).
109. See CAN EUROPE, supra note 67, at 27 (indicating that installations reduce
emissions by lowering their consumption of and demand for energy). Although
requiring installations to pay for emissions is costly in the short run, the “polluter
pays principle” provides the biggest incentive for installations to reduce emissions,
and therefore results in the most effective emissions trading system in the long-run.
Id.
110. See GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 13, at
2 (explaining the dangers, or “allocation battles,” of allocating emissions
allowances to installations and industries free of charge).
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governments do not allocate emissions allowances free of charge.111
Germany limits the regulatory burdens of the installations when it
provides them with free emissions allowances.112 These installations,
in turn, can sell to installations in other Member States that have
higher regulatory burdens to meet.113
The installations in other Member States will have to pay German
steel installations a monetary value for the emissions allowances that
they buy.114 Therefore, because German steel installations can sell
emissions allowances on the market to competing installations in
other Member States,115 their emissions allowances represent a
monetary value. Thus, Germany’s practice of allocating emissions
allowances free of charge constitutes a financial contribution because
it involves “a direct transfer of funds.”116

111. See Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 12, art. 10 (mandating that
during Phase I, governments must allocate at least ninety-five percent of emissions
allowances free of charge, and during Phase II, decreasing the number to at least
ninety percent of emissions allowances that governments must allocate free of
charge).
112. See Kurkowski, supra note 13, at 702 (describing the competitive
advantage of installations that receive emissions allowances free of charge). But
see GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 13, at 16
(construing competitiveness as the “ability to make a profit from business
activities,” and reasoning that free allowances do not impact competitiveness
because they alter the “price for all installations equally”).
113. Kurkowski, supra note 13, at 702.
114. See id. at 717 (explaining that capital flows from the installation that has to
buy allowances from an installation in another Member State—the importer of
allowances—to the German installation selling the allowances—the exporter of
allowances); see also GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra
note 13, at 3 (analogizing that the legislature has, in effect, made carbon dioxide
emissions allowances “a tradable good”).
115. See Kurkowski, supra note 13, at 704 (introducing emissions trading as a
“cap-and-trade” scheme where firms have the choice of keeping emissions at or
below a certain cap by investing in better technology, or buying emissions
allowances on the market to remain below the cap; thus a marketplace develops for
these purchases).
116. See SCM Agreement, supra note 17, art. 1.1(a)(1)(i), 1869 U.N.T.S. at 14.
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2. Because the Emissions Allowances Do Not Reflect Market Value
and Thus, Distort the Free Market System, a “Benefit is...
Conferred” to the German Steel Industry
Germany’s financial contribution, resulting from its allocation of
free emissions allowances, results in a benefit conferred to its steel
industry.117 In Canada—Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian
Aircraft, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s interpretation of
“benefit” as an advantage to the recipient in the market, and stated
that “the marketplace provides an appropriate basis for comparison
in determining whether a ‘benefit’ has been ‘conferred.’”118 Financial
contributions distort trade, and a panel can identify this distortion by
determining whether the industry received the financial contribution
on “terms more favourable than those available to the recipient in the
market.”119
In an efficient emissions trading market, installations have the
incentive to invest in low carbon technology to avoid buying
emissions allowances in the market.120 However, when Germany
allocates free emissions allowances, these incentives disappear
because installations will not have to pay for allowances.121
117. See id. art. 1.1(a), (b), 1869 U.N.T.S. at 14 (mandating that a subsidy exists
when a governmental measure involves a financial contribution and a “benefit is
thereby conferred”).
118. Canada-Civilian Aircraft, supra note 87 ¶¶ 149–61 (emphasizing that the
structure of Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement is concerned with the benefit to the
recipient and does not concern the cost to the government). The Appellate Body
also contends that the marketplace provides an “appropriate basis” for calculating
whether the measure made the recipient better off). Id.
119. Id. ¶ 157.
120. See OPERATOR’S GUIDE, supra note 1, at 3 (instructing that emissions
trading schemes use a “market-based mechanism to incentivise” installations to
reduce emissions in a “cost-effective and economically-efficient manner”). In
addition, installations can buy allowances on the market, or they can sell any extra
allowances they generated from reducing their emissions. Id. CAN EUROPE, supra
note 67, at 27 (advancing the proposition that when governments require
installations to pay for their emissions allowances, they provide the installations
with the incentive to switch fuels, lower consumption, invest in better technology,
and reduce energy demand); GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT,
supra note 13, at 9 (showing that the “possibility of selling unused allowances”
provides installations with an incentive to invest in low carbon technology).
121. See GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 13, at
16 (emphasizing that the purpose of emissions trading is to place a “greater
burden” on those installations with high carbon technology, and the “intended
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Therefore, under Germany’s NAP, installations receive allowances
on terms more favorable than the terms they would otherwise receive
in the market.122
By allocating free emissions allowances, Germany also distorts the
emissions market in such a way that allowances no longer reflect
market value.123 When emissions allowances no longer reflect market
value, the German steel industry has an advantage over steel
industries in other Member States.124 The distribution methods that
Germany used in its NAP are the main reasons that the emissions
allowances do not reflect market value.125
Under the grandfathering method of distribution, Germany based
the allocation of allowances on the amount of greenhouse gases
installations emitted in the past during a particular “base” period.126
However, the E.U. Scheme leaves the crucial choice of assigning a
base period to the Member States, which results in high gaming
incentives and rent seeking by those that it affects.127 Under the
benchmarking method of distribution, Germany based the allocation
of emissions allowances on the expected or potential output
outcome of [the] regulation” is to provide incentives to these installations to invest
in low carbon technologies).
122. See id. at 3 (explaining that Member States should introduce emissions
allowances as a new scarce resource, and this scarcity factor will drive the ultimate
cost of emissions allowances in the market).
123. See id. (providing that an ideal emissions trading system allows market
mechanisms to control the prices of the individual units, and all the government
needs to do is create the proper conditions to allow trading to occur); see also
Lohr, supra note 6 (suggesting that the most important step in combating climate
change is setting a “real price on carbon emissions,” which allows for greater
efficiency in the short-run, and more investment in better technology and research
in the long-run).
124. See Kurkowski, supra note 13, at 709 (predicting that inconsistent
allocation methods may provide industries in one Member State with an advantage
over industries in another Member State).
125. See GERMAN NAP, supra note 53, at 21 (explaining that the German
government used historical emissions data and announced emissions to allocate its
emissions allowances during Phase I of the E.U. Scheme, and it also applied
“Special Rules” under certain circumstances).
126. See CAN EUROPE, supra note 67, at 24–25 (elaborating that Member States
use this as their primary method of allocation, but because base years and the
methods of calculation for emissions differ between the Member States, this
method is problematic).
127. See id. at 25 (concluding that the grandfathering method of allocation has
led to complaints about fairness between Member States).
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quantities of a product.128 However, calculating these amounts is
extremely difficult and “fraught... with imperfections and potentially
significant deviations from reality.”129
Under both of the methods that Germany used, perpetuating the
status quo by granting more allowances to installations that emitted a
greater amount of emissions in the past was inevitable.130 This results
because when governments distribute emissions allowances free of
charge, they base distribution on many factors that are not
necessarily representative of market value.131 These factors include
different types of pressures from interest groups or powerful
industries with various political, social, or financial agendas.132
In addition, Germany applies special rules, which are more lenient,
to its steel industry.133 Therefore, the steel installations have lower
reduction obligations to meet in comparison to other industries.134
Moreover, special rules cause installations to postpone investment in
more energy-efficient technology.135 These special rules result in the
128. See id. (noting that this method of allocation is favorable to the
grandfathering method, especially for new entrants, because it does not require
past emissions data to determine the allocation amount of emissions allowances).
But see GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 13, at 4
(insisting that three conditions—preclusion of production distortions by
installations for the purpose of maximizing allocations, security of long-term rights
of use, and unrestricted tradability of allowances— must exist in order for the
allocation process to be “effective and efficient” and to “give rise to the logical
necessity for the allocation of allowances not to be linked to future output”).
129. CAN EUROPE, supra note 67, at 26.
130. See id. at 25 (warning that the benchmarking method of distribution can
exaggerate the situation very easily in terms of carbon dioxide emissions when the
government uses it improperly).
131. See Petsonk, supra note 65, at 207 (addressing the possibility that a
government might allocate emissions allowances to further particular policies that
it considers important).
132. See Kurkowski, supra note 13, at 711 (conceding that the discretion that
Member States have in allocating emissions allowances results in huge incentives
for different interest groups to invest in lobbying efforts to try to influence the
allocation decisions where “billions of euros” are often at stake).
133. See GERMAN NAP, supra note 53, at 39 (enumerating the compliance
factor for process-related emissions as one example).
134. See GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 13, at
12 (finding that the German government applied special rules to almost half of the
emissions allowances that it allocated during Phase I of the E.U. Scheme).
135. See id. (theorizing that installations postpone investments to keep their
options open and maximize their future allocations of emissions allowances).
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grant of a greater number of allowances to inefficient installations, as
opposed to those installations that adopt efficient technological
measures to protect the environment.136
The E.U. Scheme allows Member States to have discretion over
how to allocate their emissions allowances between the industries
and installations within their countries.137 Germany uses this
discretion to employ distribution methods and apply rules that result
in allocations that distort the market system, benefiting its domestic
steel industry.138 Because Germany makes a financial contribution to
the steel industry when it freely allocates emissions allowances,
conferring a benefit to the steel industry, Germany’s method of
distribution could constitute a subsidy under the SCM Agreement.139

B. GERMANY’S ALLOCATION OF FREE EMISSIONS ALLOWANCES
COULD BE EITHER AN ACTIONABLE SUBSIDY OR A NONACTIONABLE SUBSIDY UNDER THE SCM AGREEMENT
The governmental measure at issue here is Germany’s allocation
of free emissions allowances (particularly to its steel industry) that
Germany instituted pursuant to its NAP, which it enacted under the
Directive.140 A subsidy exists because the governmental measure at

136. See GERMAN NAP, supra note 53, at 29 (noting that the grandfathering
process provides more favorable allowances to inefficient installations rather than
to efficient ones, and highlighting the Council’s efforts to counter this problem by
permitting governments to credit early action measures by installations in the form
of special allowances).
137. See Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 12, art. 9 (providing guidelines,
rather than requirements, that Member States should follow when they devise their
NAPs for each period to which Article 11(1) and (2) refers); see also Kurkowski,
supra note 13, at 702, 708–09 (critiquing discretionary emissions allowance
allocation on the grounds that equity concerns result if Member States are
susceptible to the narrow interests of powerful industries, and that preferential
treatment to favored industries burdens other industries, the taxpayers, and the
non-trading sectors).
138. See GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 13, at
16 (concluding that the allocation of free emissions allowances has the effect of an
“across-the-board subsidy not linked to output” and therefore results in windfall
profits to the participating installations).
139. See SCM Agreement, supra note 17, art. 1.1, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 14.
140. See GERMAN NAP, supra note 53, at 39 (providing that process-related
carbon-dioxide emissions will apply to the manufacture of oxygen and steel and in
pig iron production therefore qualifying them for special rules allowances).
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issue is a financial contribution that confers a benefit to the German
steel industry. The SCM Agreement distinguishes between three
types of subsidies.141 The allocation of free allowances is clearly not
a prohibited subsidy because the practice is not contingent on “export
performance,” nor is it contingent on “the use of domestic over
imported goods.”142 However, a panel could find that the measure is
either an actionable subsidy143 or a non-actionable subsidy.144
1. Germany’s Allocation of Free Emissions Allowances Could Be an
Actionable Subsidy
A panel could find that the allocation of free emissions allowances
by Germany is an actionable subsidy. Under the SCM Agreement, an
actionable subsidy exists when a governmental measure is specific145
and causes “adverse effects to the interests”146 of other Member
Countries. These effects include: “an injury to the domestic industry
of another Member; nullification or impairment of benefits...;147 or
serious prejudice148 to the interests of another Member.”149
141. See SCM Agreement, supra note 83, arts. 3, 5, 8, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 16, 18,
23–25.
142. See id. art. 3, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 16.
143. See id. art. 5, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 18 (defining an actionable subsidy as a
measure that causes “adverse effects to the interests of other Members, i.e.: (a)
injury to the domestic industry of another Member; (b) nullification or impairment
of benefits accruing directly or indirectly. . .; (c) serious prejudice to the interests
of another Member”).
144. See id. art. 8.1, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 22 (defining non-actionable subsidies as
those that fail the specificity test of Article 2, or satisfy one of its exceptions); id.
art. 9.1, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 25 (limiting the scope of non-actionable subsidies to
situations in which the subsidies cause “serious adverse effects” to the domestic
industry of another Member Country).
145. See id. art. 1.2, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 14 (subjecting a subsidy to the provision
of Part III, which elaborates on actionable subsidies, only if the subsidy meets the
specificity requirements articulated in Article 2).
146. Id. art. 5, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 18.
147. See id. art. 5(b), 1869 U.N.T.S. at 18 (elaborating that the nullification or
impairment of benefits accruing could be either direct or indirect, and referring in
particular the benefits of GATT 1994 Article II concessions); see, e.g., USTR
STATEMENT, supra note 89 (stating that an instance of nullification or impairment
occurs when a subsidy negates the value of a tariff cut).
148. See SCM Agreement, supra note 17, art. 6, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 18–20
(defining a serious prejudice to exist when: the “total ad valorem subsidization of a
product” exceeds five percent; the subsidies cover operating losses that an industry
has to endure; the subsidies cover operating losses other than “one-time measures”
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In order for a panel to hold that a governmental measure is an
actionable subsidy, the measure must meet the specificity
requirement set forth in Article 2 of the SCM Agreement.150 The
allocation of free allowances meets this specificity requirement
because Germany “explicitly limits access” of the emissions
allowances to the industries that the Directive includes in the E.U.
Scheme.151 The NAP explains that other measures and policies
govern those industries that the Directive does not include in the
E.U. Scheme, such as the transport and household sectors.152
Therefore, since the Directive explicitly limits the NAP to certain
industries,153 it meets the specificity requirement.
When Germany allocates all of its emissions allowances free of
charge to its steel industry, it could cause adverse effects to the steel
industry of another Member State. Germany’s measure could
potentially injure the steel industry of another Member State that
does not receive its emissions allowances free of charge, but through
another method of allocation, such as the auction method.154 The

that are “given merely to provide time for the development of long-term solutions”
and to avoid short-term social problems; or “the direct forgiveness of debt” that an
installation owes to the government); see also USTR STATEMENT, supra note 89
(explaining that a panel will base the determination of serious prejudice on
measurable and verifiable data).
149. See SCM Agreement, supra note 17, art. 5, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 18
(prohibiting Members from enacting a subsidy, as defined in Article 1, that causes
adverse effects to the interests of other Members).
150. Id. art. 1.2, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 14.
151. Id. art. 2.1(a), 1869 U.N.T.S. at 15.
152. See id. See GERMAN NAP, supra note 53, at 20 (listing some of the most
successful measures and policies for climate protection in the transport sector as
“ecological tax reform,” “promotion of renewable energy sources for fuels,” and a
“campaign to encourage a climate-conscious attitude in transport”). Some of the
most successful measures in the household sector include a carbon dioxide
reduction program, a carbon dioxide building redevelopment program, and a
housing modernization program. Id.
153. See id. at 7 (pointing out that the installations that the NAP covers for
emissions trading, for the most part, comprise the energy and industrial sectors).
154. See Petsonk, supra note 65, at 207 (characterizing the auction method as
one in which a country sells either a portion or all of its emissions allowances to
the installations that can afford to bid the highest for them); see also CAN EUROPE,
supra note 67, at 28 (explaining that only four Member States have used the
auction method, but none of them have used it extensively).
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foreign steel industry would have a higher regulatory burden to meet
because it would have to pay for its emissions allowances.155
Germany could also seriously prejudice the interests of another
Member State by covering the operating losses its own steel industry
would have to endure,156 while other Member States might not grant
their industries the same luxury. The subsidy could have the effect of
a significant undercutting of the price of steel in Germany as
opposed to the other Member States.157 Germany would have the
burden of demonstrating that serious prejudice to the interests of
other Member States does not result from its method of allocation.158
2. Germany’s Allocation of Free Emissions Allowances Could Be a
Non-Actionable Subsidy
A panel could find that the allocation of emissions allowances free
of charge by Germany is a non-actionable subsidy if the measure
meets the criteria laid out in Article 8 of the SCM Agreement.159 A
subsidy that meets the non-actionable criteria does not invoke
consultations and remedies unless the “Member has reason to believe
that [the action] has resulted in serious adverse effects to the
domestic industry of that Member.”160 However, Member States may
155. See Kurkowski, supra note 13, at 702, 709 (hypothesizing that differing
allocation methods between Member States could give an industry in one Member
State a competitive advantage over an industry in another Member State).
156. See SCM Agreement, supra note 17, art. 6.1(b), 6.1(c), 1869 U.N.T.S. at 18
(identifying measures that the government enacts to cover operating losses as an
act seriously prejudicial to the interests of another Member State).
157. See generally id. art. 6.3, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 19 (giving various instances in
which serious prejudice may arise including instances where the subsidy
significantly undercuts the price of the subsidized product).
158. See USTR STATEMENT, supra note 89 (explaining that if a subsidy falls
within any of the four categories listed in Article 6.1 of the SCM Agreement, a
WTO panel will presume serious prejudice, and will place the burden on the
subsidizing government to prove that serious prejudice did not result from its
actions).
159. See SCM Agreement, supra note 17, art. 8, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 22–25
(elaborating that subsidies are non-actionable if they are not specific, or if they are
specific and fall into one of the three categories set forth in Article 8.2:
government assistance for certain research activities; assistance to disadvantaged
regions for development; or assistance to promote adaptation of facilities to new
environmental requirements).
160. See id. art. 9, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 25 (providing circumstances under which
Member Countries can invoke consultations and remedies for non-actionable
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request consultations and authorized remedies for these types of
subsidies if they cause “serious adverse effects” to their domestic
industry and the damage that the subsidies cause is “difficult to
repair.”161
The German government likely would argue that although the
allocation of free allowances is not a subsidy, if a panel did find that
the measure was a subsidy, it would be non-actionable because it
meets the criteria laid out in Article 8.2(c) of the SCM Agreement
regarding assistance for environmental regulations.162 The
government would argue that the measure constitutes government
“assistance to promote adaptation of existing facilities” to “new
environmental requirements.”163 The German government would
then argue that the Directive laid out new requirements that
installations had to meet,164 and by freely allocating allowances,
Germany simply was aiding installations as it adjusted to the new
requirements.
While the German NAP allowed for the allocation of free
emissions allowances in Phase I of E.U. Scheme,165 it also allows for
the allocation of free allowances in Phase II.166 The measure at issue,
therefore, does not meet the first condition: that the assistance must
be a “one-time non-recurring measure.”167 Moreover, within each

subsidies).
161. Id. art. 9.1, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 25; see USTR STATEMENT, supra note 89
(explaining that the standard of “serious adverse effects” that non-actionable
subsidies must meet is a much higher standard than the “serious prejudice” or
“injury” standard for other subsidies).
162. See SCM Agreement, supra note 17, art. 8.2(c), 1869 U.N.T.S. at 24
(including assistance to promote the adaptation of existing facilities to
environmental regulations in the category of non-actionable subsidies).
163. Id.
164. See Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 12, art. 1 (mandating that
installations reduce greenhouse gas emissions and establishing a scheme to
facilitate carbon dioxide emissions trading between the Member States).
165. GERMAN NAP, supra note 53, at 4.
166. Id. at 21.
167. See SCM Agreement, supra note 17, art. 8.2(c), 1869 U.N.T.S. at 24
(explaining that although the environmental regulations would result in “greater
constraints and financial burden” on the installations, the assistance is only nonactionable if it is a “one-time non-recurring measure” and meets the four other
criteria listed in 8.2(c)).
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Phase, Germany issues the allowances in annual distributions.168
Thus, the measure is recurring.
Nevertheless, even if Germany convinced a panel that it met all
the criteria for a non-actionable environmental subsidy, the panel
may still recommend that it remove the measure.169 A Member State
could challenge the measure because it caused “serious adverse
effects”170 to its steel industry that were too “difficult to repair.”171 If
a Subsidies Committee agreed, then Germany would have to remove
the measure within six months.172

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The European Union cannot accomplish the lofty objective of the
E.U. Scheme if its Member States distribute emissions allowances
free of charge. The E.U. Scheme can operate at its most efficient
level and achieve emissions reductions at the lowest possible cost
and in the most effective manner possible173 only if Member States
distribute allowances under the auction method.174 The Council
should amend the Directive in the following two key ways to prepare
for Phase II of the E.U. Scheme.

168. See GERMAN NAP, supra note 53, at 4 (detailing that Germany will issue
the emissions allowances yearly by February 28 “of the year in question”).
169. See SCM Agreement, supra note 17, art. 9.4, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 25 (noting
that if a Committee concludes that serious adverse effects exist, it may recommend
that the subsidizing Member Country modify its measure to remove the effects). If
the Member Country does not modify its measure, the Committee can authorize
the “requesting Member to take appropriate countermeasures.” Id.
170. Id. art. 9.1, 1869 U.N.T.S. at 25.
171. Id.
172. See USTR STATEMENT, supra note 89 (explaining that two Member
Countries can determine through consultations whether a subsidy caused serious
adverse effects, and if these consultations are unsuccessful, then a Subsidies
Committee has 120 days to determine whether the measure meets the higher
serious adverse effects standard). In addition, if a Committee does find serious
adverse effects, the subsidizing Member Country has six months to remove them,
or the Committee can authorize the complaining Member Country to take
proportional countermeasures. Id.
173. See Kurkowski, supra note 13, at 700 (affirming that the current design of
the method of allocation in the E.U. Scheme results in efficiency concerns relating
to the proper functioning of the market to achieve the environmental goals that the
Directive envisioned and equity concerns relating to the redistribution of wealth).
174. CAN EUROPE, supra note 67, at 27.
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First, the Council should ensure that Member States impose a
minimum level of scarcity on the amount of emissions allowances
they establish in their Macroplans by providing a uniform formula to
calculate this level. Second, the Council should give Member States
strict guidelines regarding the methods of distribution that they
include in their Microplans. Further, the Council should not hesitate
to reject NAPs that do not conform to the criteria that it
establishes.175

A. THE COUNCIL SHOULD AMEND THE DIRECTIVE TO ENSURE
THAT MEMBER STATES IMPOSE A UNIFORM MINIMUM LEVEL OF
SCARCITY
The E.U. Scheme allows installations to make higher profits from
low carbon technologies and provides incentives for installations to
invest in those technologies.176 Those in favor of allocations of free
allowances argue that a free “needs-based” allocation process is
necessary to secure the German industries’ competitive position.177
However, installations within an industry gain a competitive edge
when they engage in activities that allow them to use less of their
emissions allowances, so the allocation of free allowances has no
impact on competitiveness.178 Therefore, Member States should
integrate emissions allowances into industries as a new scarce
resource, so that the scarcity factor will control the market value of
emissions allowances.179 Otherwise, without a sufficient degree of
175. See id. art. 9 (allowing the Council to reject a Member State’s NAP within
three months of its submission if it does not meet the criteria set forth in Article 10
and Annex III of the Directive); see also Watchman, supra note 57, at 201
(elaborating that the Council reduced the amount of emissions that Member States
planned to allocate in their initial NAP submissions by four percent). Furthermore,
the Council rejected thirteen NAPs for allowing adjustments to the amount of
allowances that they allocated to installations. Id.
176. See GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 13, at
2 (demonstrating that the E.U. Scheme’s regulatory provisions do not inhibit an
industry’s competitive edge).
177. See id. (arguing the paradoxical nature of the argument because capping
emissions is inherent in the success of an emissions trading system, and by basing
allocation on needs, the Member States would no longer be able to attain the
objective of capping emissions).
178. See id. (observing that “changes in competitiveness” arise from the scarcity
of emissions allowances).
179. See id. at 3 (explaining that because carbon dioxide emissions effectively
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scarcity, installations would have no need to buy or sell emissions
allowances.180
As it currently stands, the Directive does not give the Council any
legal basis for imposing a specific minimum level of scarcity on the
allocation of emissions allowances.181 The Council should devise a
central formula that Member States must use to calculate the total
amount of emissions allowances they will allocate during Phase II.
By doing so the Council will ensure that the price of the emissions
reflects market values.
Since Annex III of the Directive gives Member States criteria to
follow when they devise their NAPs,182 within this Annex, the
Council should calculate the most efficient formula to achieve the
optimal minimum level of scarcity for the quantity of emissions
allowances that Member States should include in their Macroplans
for Phase II.183 The Council should mandate that Member States use
this formula when they calculate their emissions budgets. If need be,
it should update the formula during subsequent phases to adapt to
future conditions.

B. THE COUNCIL SHOULD AMEND THE DIRECTIVE TO ENSURE
THAT THE MEMBER STATES USE CONSISTENT METHODS OF
DISTRIBUTION
The Council devised the E.U. Scheme in a way that gave Member
States too much discretion when they develop their NAPs. This
discretion allows Member States to use distribution methods that do
not result in the most efficient allocation of emissions allowances.
The Council should mandate that every Member State use the same
methods of allocating allowances for every installation. By doing so,
it will ensure that social factors, political factors, or powerful interest
become traded goods, installations must take their costs into account when
planning optimal production quantities, and therefore, they represent a new
constraint to those operating installations).
180. See Kurkowski, supra note 13, at 708 (stressing that with insufficient
scarcity, Phase I of the E.U. Scheme “would serve no practical purpose”).
181. See id.
182. See Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 12, Annex III.
183. See GERMAN NAP, supra note 53, at 6 (explaining that Macroplans define
the total emissions budget of Member States and include the total quantity of
emissions allowances that a Member State can allocate).
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groups do not bias the Member States’ governments when they
devise their Microplans.184 This will result in a fairer allocation of
emissions allowances to industries between the Member States.
First, the Council should eliminate the use of special rules that
Member States can apply under certain circumstances.185 Next, the
Council should amend Article 10 of the Directive, which mandates
that Member States distribute at least ninety percent of emissions
allowances free of charge during Phase II.186 As Part III above
demonstrates, when Member States allocate emissions allowances
free of charge, they become vulnerable to subsidy claims under the
SCM Agreement.187 The Council should allow for a gradual
transition into a system that mandates that installations bid for onehundred percent of their emissions allowances.188 Thus, during Phase
II, the Council should mandate that each Member State shall allocate
seventy-five percent of emissions allowances free of charge.189
Member States should allocate the same number of allowances
free of charge to avoid unfairness between the countries and possible
subsidy claims.190 In addition, Article 10 should include a separate
paragraph stating which distribution methods each Member State
should employ:

184. See Kurkowski, supra note 13, at 702 (noting that the influence of powerful
interest groups can make state regulators vulnerable and can bias them to favor
certain installations when they make their allocation decisions).
185. See GERMAN ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 13, at
12 (opining that the special rules foster uncertainty and strategic behavior and as a
result, installations postpone investment in low carbon technology).
186. Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 12, art. 10.
187. See supra Part III.A–B (analyzing that a panel could conclude that the
allocation of free emissions allowances by Germany is a subsidy, and it could be
either actionable or non-actionable). If the subsidy is non-actionable, Germany
may still have to modify the measures to remove serious adverse effects to other
Member States. See id. Part III.B.2.
188. See CAN EUROPE, supra note 67, at 27 (explaining that the only way that
governments can implement the “polluter pays principle” in the E.U. Scheme is by
using the auction method of distribution and mandating that installations pay for all
of their emissions allowances).
189. See Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 12, art. 10 (allowing a less
stringent method of allocation by stating “Member States shall allocate at least
ninety percent of the allowances free of charge”) (emphasis added).
190. See supra Part III.A (analyzing how subsidies can arise when some
countries allow the allocation of free emissions allowances, and others do not).
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Each Member State must allocate allowances for the five-year
period beginning 1 January 2008 using the same distribution
methods. For each industry, twenty-five percent of the allowances
must be auctioned to the highest bidder, twenty-five percent of the
allowances must be granted free of charge using the grandfathering
method of distribution, and fifty percent of the allowances must be
granted free of charge using the benchmarking method of
distribution.
Consistency in allocation methods between Member States will
ensure fairness. Therefore, the Council should not allow Member
States to auction more or less than twenty-five percent of allowances
for Phase II.191 However, during subsequent phases of the E.U.
Scheme, the Council should mandate that Member States distribute
one-hundred percent of the emissions allowances through the auction
method.192 By ensuring that the allocation methodologies between
the Member States are consistent and harmonized,193 the Council will
guarantee that a fair allocation of emissions allowances results and
will avoid possible subsidy claims between Member States.
Throughout the review and approval process, the Council should
take advantage of its oversight power over the NAPs, and should
reject those that do not conform. 194 Although the Council has the
191. See supra Part III.A–B (demonstrating that even though the auction method
is the most efficient, when Member States use inconsistent methods of allocation,
this could result in possible subsidy claims).
192. See Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 12, art. 30(c) (acknowledging
the need to harmonize the methods of distribution between the Member States
during subsequent phases of the E.U. Scheme); see also CAN EUROPE, supra note
67, at 27 (reaffirming the Council’s consideration, which it articulated in Article
30, and recommending that Member States increase the use of the auction method
during future phases). In addition, the auction method is preferable to the
grandfathering and benchmark methods because it generates revenue that the
government can use to spend on research and development for more fuel-efficient
technologies. Id.
193. See Kurkowski, supra note 13, at 728 (arguing that a fair allocation of
emissions allowances that has minimal negative distributional consequences results
from a “consistent methodology or allocation formula” across the Member States
of the European Union).
194. See Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 12, art. 9. But see Kurkowski,
supra note 13, at 709–10 (arguing that the E.U. Scheme should allow Member
States to have some flexibility when they devise their NAPs). One should weigh
any distributional consequences against state sovereignty concerns, and the fact
that each Member State is probably in the best position to determine how many
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authorization to amend the Directive,195 if it chooses not to amend it,
however, the Member States should, and can, do so by a majority
vote.196 By amending the Directive, the Member States will ensure
that the European Union meets the goals and objectives of the
Directive,197 not only at the lowest possible cost, but also through the
most effective means possible.

V. CONCLUSION
Even though the E.U. Scheme is a good model for emissions
trading in the international arena and meeting commitments under
the Kyoto Protocol, as the German NAP demonstrates, the E.U.
Scheme is still not perfect. The Council can, and should, amend the
E.U. Scheme to eliminate possible subsidy claims between Member
States. By imposing a uniform formula for Member States to
calculate allowance caps to ensure scarcity, and by harmonizing
allocation methods between the Member States, the European Union
will be able to attain emissions reductions in the most cost-effective
and equitable manner possible.

emissions allowances each industry and its various installations should receive. Id.
195. See supra Part IV.A–B (recommending the ways in which the Council
should amend the Directive).
196. See Kurkowski, supra note 13, at 729 (explaining that while the Council
can amend the Directive, it “has indicated that it does not intend to do so”).
197. See Council Directive 2003/87, supra note 12, ¶ 5 (stating that the goal of
the Directive is to help Member States achieve their reduction commitments under
the Kyoto Protocol “through an efficient European market in greenhouse gas
emission allowances, with the least possible diminution of economic development
and employment”).

